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INNOVTION AND REGULATION IN ICT. 
KEYS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Omar de León
Abstract: The expansion of broadband speed and coverage over IP technology, which extend 
over transport and terminal access networks, has increased the demand for applications and 
content which by being provided over it, uniformly give rise to convergence. These shifts in 
technologies and enterprise business models are giving rise to the necessity for changing the 
perspective and scope of the Universal Service and of the regulation frameworks, with this last 
one based in the same principles as always but varying its application. Several aspects require 
special and renewed attention, such as the definition of relevant markets and dominant oper-
ators, the role of packages, interconnection of IP networks, network neutrality, the use of the 
spectrum with a vision of value for the citizenship, the application of the competition frame-
work, new forms of licensing, treatment of the risk in the networks, changes in the regulatory 
authorities, amongst others. These matters are treated from the perspective of the actual trends 
in the world and its conceptual justification.
Keywords: Broadband, network investment, convergence, open access, regulatory change, 
convergent regulation, IP interconnection, relevant markets and convergence operators, net-
work neutrality, spectrum, bilateral markets.
Comments: Paper presented at the IBEI-CEPAL international seminar “Innovación y regu-
lación en las TIC.Una perspectiva comparada entre Europa y América Latina”. Barcelona, 30 
September – 1 October 2013.
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1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF TELECOMU-
NICATIONS DEVELOPMENT
 In the last years three phenomena have been produced which feedback each 
other and create a new context for the development of telecommunications: 
The expansion of the deployment of diverse accessibility technologies for fixed 
and mobile broadband, which allow data rates which support all applications and 
content. This expansion reduces the costs and increases the demand for these ser-
vices, both for entertainment and as support for social and economic development.
The convergence of content providers and applications over the same networks 
and the same terminals, which generates a stimulus for the use of these networks 
by improving the user experience, and scale economies with important additional 
cost reduction.
The definition of government policies which stimulate the deployment and use of 
these networks, progressively categorizing these policies to hold the same hierar-
chy as those for access to education, health, justice, etc.
 The joint advance of these three phenomena, along with their feedback, are 
strongly modifying the behavior of the markets from the perspective of offer and de-
mand, provoking among other consequences the need for a revision of the regulations 
with a different degree of profoundity in their perspective depending on each country.
 From their inception onwards, regulations had common patterns in every 
country, based mainly on the regulation of services as separate networks (fixed, mo-
bile, data), and with the main objective of defense  and promotion of competition 
and of the provision of a universal service which is considered extremely elementary 
from the actual perspective (telephony for everyone).
 Ahead of the environment sketched at the beginning, while the basic principles 
of regulation, competition, and universality are maintained, the greater complexity of 
the application of these principles has generated various currents of analysis and pro-
posed solutions which substantially differ between countries. It would be enough to 
take a look at the reach of universalization and its objectives for observing that diversi-
ty: open access broadband to every home in Australia, carrier broadband in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, and New Zealand, governmental stimulus to private enterprise in 
Chile and USA, as well as cases of different nature in Latin America and the world. 
In each and every case the method of funding and its regulation differ, but it always 
attempts to favor and exploit, rather than to interfere through private investment.
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 In this work we attempt to bring the key aspects in this development to the 
realm of analysis: unique or multiservice licensing, IP interconnection, network neu-
trality, the definition of the markets and the dominant operators, the incidence of 
content, the new efficient management of the spectrum, the management of the na-
tional broadband networks, among others.
 We observe the perspective of different tendencies in countries, and we con-
sider documents from the International Telecommunications Union such as the fol-
lowing: Optimal or Ideal Practice Guidelines from the GSR 2010 and the GSR 2011, 
Intelligent Regulation for a Broadband World in Trends 2012, Competition and Reg-
ulation in a Broadband World in 2012, and Regulatory Aspect of Transnational Tele-
communications in a Connected Society in Trends 2013.
2. SUMMARY 
 
 In the process of development of broadband networks we observe that ex-
traordinary investment is required in countries with well supplied markets by a large 
amount of providers which do not have the necessary scale for these huge deploy-
ments. In many cases, even the largest operators cannot find the regulatory condi-
tions which stimulate these high risk investments, which demand specific rate of 
return greater than the average return of operators of this industry.
 This is how the need for intervention of the state arises both in developing 
and developed countries.
The open access to these national broadband networks may be a compliment which 
allows several service providers to access essential resources in non-discriminatory 
conditions. In many cases it is impossible to conceive these networks without open 
access, such as when there is state financing, and so enable the development of down-
stream competition.
 The sharing of infrastructure between operators is an important factor in the 
facilitation of efficient deployment, as long as it doesn’t imply non competitive con-
ducts of the ubiquitous broadband networks.
 As far as regulation itself goes, and due to convergence, it is necessary to redis-
gn the policies and regulations for a transition to the new economy in which products 
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and services from various industries converge, some of them unregulated by the tel-
ecommunications authorities such as that of content, finance, and others.
 For the ex-ante intervention in a convergence environment, the cumulative 
criteria established in the recommendation of relevant markets from the European 
Union remains valid:
First criteria. Presence of strong non-transitional obstacles to the access to the 
market, either of a structural, legal, or regulatory nature.
Second criteria. Markets whose structure does not tend towards effective compe-
tition within the pertinent time horizon. The application of this criteria implies the 
examination of the situation of competition behind these obstacles for access. It 
applies a prospective vision.
Third criteria. If the application of the legislation about competition does not al-
low to adequately tackle the flaws of the market.
 In that framework of the existence of innovation and technological advance-
ment in markets forces additional precautions regarding the ex-ante intervention 
due to uncertainty about the evolution of the situation, including potentially imper-
ceptible future competitors, which will not allow these criteria with to be applied 
with certainty.
 In a convergence environment the main question which emerges when at-
tempting to secure the competition is: how are the markets and the significative mar-
ket power defined? The identification of relevant markets, prerequisite for the anal-
ysis of competitive behavior, requires considering the convergence due to the users 
visualizing the telecommunication services as a vehicle for accessing other services, 
content and applications. This way, the services which are to be analyzed are inte-
grated with services from several industries. The identification of the operators with 
significative market power exhibits similar peculiarities to those which arise when 
defining markets.
 Due to the evolution in the field of network interconnection, IP interconnec-
tion for multimedia services should be taken progressively in consideration starting 
from the current situation of interconnection with the objective of providing Internet 
access. This matter is the subject of recent work with very important discrepancies 
between operators and regulators, mainly in economic aspects.
 Network neutrality ensures the possibility of offering services transparently 
with different broadband specifications, and avoid the artificial discrimination in the 
use that the customers give it.
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 The conversion of certain telecommunications infrastructures into platforms, 
such as the case of ISPs, makes it necessary to review economic regulation criteria 
which take into consideration different economic aspects in contrast to those of uni-
lateral markets.
 Finally when it comes to spectrum, a very scarce resource in the low frequen-
cies, it is subjected to the requirements of its use for broadcasting and for mobile 
services, mainly broadband. It is necessary to find a balance based on the value of 
final services, including the intangible values for society.
 In conclusion, telecommunications find themselves in the middle of an in-
teresting period of innovative development unlike anything previously seen, which 
requires a set of factors such as the ones indicated to be taken into consideration. 
Contrary to what was observed before these changes, there is no unique recipe of 
policies but instead a plethora of applicable policies for different circumstances, over 
the basis of principles such as that of competition, in which each country will find 
the optimal path for dealing with these challenges.
3. ANALYSIS
3.1 Evolution of the networks
 Networks, with their current evolution, are in no condition for withstanding a 
rapid growth of services, content, and applications which require much higher band-
width. It is therefore necessary to make astounding investments where as a result of 
having taken the correct actions in areas of competition amongst regulation and pol-
icy makers, competing fragmented enterprise markets lack the power to withstand 
the said investments at a large-scale, and in high-risk conditions. 
 Several countries like Australia which is perhaps the country with the most 
ambitious plan, have taken the decision to develop national fiber optic broadband 
transport and access networks for reaching the end user. The investments in these 
networks are very large. For example, the national Australian broadband network 
will cost 43,000 million Australian dollars (US$45,000 million). In other countries 
these processes are leading to the partial re-nationalization of the infrastructure with 
the objective of obtaining scalable economies and preferential interest rates on the 
loans for the State. In other cases incentives for investment aimed at network opera-
tors are created and the aspiration is to maintain competitive offers or the combina-
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tion of public and private efforts for example in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, as well 
as in other countries. Or also soft credits to the private sector like in Korea or Japan. 
Developing countries cannot generally afford the application of important state ef-
forts, so they tend to establish incentives for investment through means which are 
relative to the fixation of prices associated to open access. 
 At any rate, there is no room for doubt as far as open access goes that it is es-
sential for the cases of the national broadband networks which are financed totally or 
partially with public funding. Open access also ensures, independently of the origin 
of the investment, that there will not exist an inefficient duplication of the networks 
and the strengthening of competition and investment in networks in the long term. 
At any rate, the application of this instrument without public funding must be metic-
ulous in order to avoid the disincentivizing of investments. 
 In the case of the European Union we should also add that the states must not 
subsidize networks which could possibly be developed independently of any subsi-
dies under conditions of competitive offers. This definition forms part of the policies 
aimed at preventing the distortion of the markets from state incentives.
3.2 Evolution of the markets due to bandwidth deployments
 Bandwidth provokes important changes in the perspective of the telecommunications 
market. They can be summarized in the following aspects:
New and different market conditions arise which do not perfectly fit within the traditional 
regulatory conceptions, but they do fit in with their principles.
It becomes necessary to apply the principles of technology and service neutrality, as 
well as the introduction of a unique or multiservice license through simple documents 
and procedures.
The principle of promoting and defending competition, as well as that of equity by which 
it is procured that telecommunications favor all citizens, are the same, but the procedures 
for their application are becoming subtle and sophisticated, as well as greatly prospective.
The definition of relevant markets, mainly due to bandwidth, requires different procedures 
because of multiple reasons related to technology, services, and other aspects which are 
also changing.
The procedure for defining providers and operators with SMP requires other factors to be 
considered which would not be considered traditionally. Relevant markets are more com-
plex due to a technological convergence and the different and variable perceptions of the 
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users regarding substitution, which simultaneously depend on the degree of maturity of 
the users and of the content and application services at their disposal.
There is no longer a simple Association of service/technology/platform/dominance.
Broadband allows packages which today may be the result from commercial policies based 
on efficiency (not anticompetitive) which are also part of the definition of the markets. 
In the analysis of dominance it is necessary to consider thew services which are provided 
over the network in a package format. TV + BA + telephone line, extending the vision of 
regulators to previously unregulated services such as television. 
There are convergent packages on the other hand (pay-per-view TV, telecinema, and broad-
band all over the same cable) and non-convergent (mobile telephony, and direct television 
from home), which require distinct treatments.
The markets change as a result of variations in the conditions that define them, the entry of 
new services and content, and others.
Relationships between enterprises which may be operating as bilateral or multilateral plat-
forms will also arise, which change the vision of the analysis of the market and the domi-
nance within it.
The reaction time of regulators in the application of corrective measures is very important 
because of the changes of the conditions of the markets. One can never regulate for the past.
3.3 Licensing
 As far as licenses go, the tendency is towards the granting of licenses which 
adapt to the convergence and the transition towards next-generation networks. They 
are generally multi-service or general licenses. In these cases it is preferable for the 
license to be as simple as possible, resting the conditions for operation upon regula-
tion and law.
 General or unified licenses are such that whoever obtains one may use it with 
the desired technology to provide all possible services. This is a powerful mechanism 
for enterprises to scale the provision of value for their users, and definitely for the 
country. On the other hand, the granting of licenses which are subjected to the legal 
and regulatory framework in effect should be free and according to demand, except in 
the cases in which limited resources are required, such as the radio-electric spectrum.
 Multiservice licenses are granted for a broad set of services, and they grant 
the user permission to use whichever technology and infrastructure he desires. This 
type of license is more flexible than service licenses but not as flexible as unified or 
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general licenses. This type of license can still be a limitant for convergence consid-
ering that, for example, you can grant a multiservice license for telecommunications 
but you may require a separate license in order to provide content services.
3.4 Network neutrality
 Network neutrality is a concept which greatly concerns regulation and the 
operation of Internet access providers around the world.
 While the interpretation is not exactly identical in every country, the follow-
ing aspects which we understand to respect the rights of the users, of Internet access 
operators, and of content, applications, and service providers in a balanced way are 
distinguished:
The freedom of operators to offer the commercial plans that they wish for their ser-
vices should be preserved, provided that they are non-discriminatory and within 
the current regulatory framework, allowing them to sell services limited in speed, 
information transfer, schedule, etc.
For every commercial plan, operators must clearly inform their clients and poten-
tial clients about the characteristics of the offered service, including the network 
management policies and their impacts towards the quality of the service, traffic 
limits, speed limits, etc.
The service access operators must not discriminate in the availability of the service 
to different content, applications, and service providers, including those which 
they own or are otherwise related to them.
For every commercial plan hired by the end-user or the content, application or 
service provider, the Internet access operators should not block, interfere with, 
discriminate against, reduce or degrade the capacity of any person to use an Inter-
net service to access, use, send, publish, receive, or offer any content, application 
or legal service through Internet. It should also not limit users in the connection 
of a device of their choice as long as it does not infringe upon any legislation or 
causes damages to the network.
3.5 IP Interconnection
 IP interconnection for multimedia services should be taken progressively into 
consideration due to its evolution, parting from interconnectivity aimed at increased 
Internet access. The demands are completely different according to the transported 
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services than for simple interconnection of Internet access. Regulators should begin 
evaluating the convenience of opportunity of advancing progressively towards an 
IP interconnection, without substantially altering the market, ensuring the interop-
erability over many layers and end to end connectivity, guaranteeing at the same 
time that every service offered in a level may be factored and that it will reach the 
client in a different level.  Regulators should also consider important to define certain 
standards of quality which established operators must guarantee to interconnected 
incomers and on a wholesale level.
 In this context it is necessary to also seek evolution towards new modes of 
payment between operators when networks are completely IP and interconnection 
happens between these networks, but at the same time in a progressive way to ad-
here to the economic equation predicted by the telephony operators and to avoid 
generating disruptive changes which could damage the service provision. It is un-
derstood that the principles of orientation to costs and competition within the current 
framework remain in effect, but careful analysis is being conducted to figure out 
which are the new cost vectors and especially which are the new economic compen-
sation models: B&K (Bill and Keep), IPNP (Initiating Party Network Pays) and RPNP 
(Receiving Party Network Pays). Everything happens in an environment of intercon-
nection prices which sharply drop worldwide.
3.6 Risk management in the deployment of new networks
 There are several aspects to consider regarding risks in the development of 
broadband infrastructure. When regulators opt for establishing precise control, or 
open access related control, it is necessary to take into consideration that not every 
cost calculation focus is equivalent. Some tend to put more risk over investors than 
others, which makes it necessary to approximate performance as closely as possible 
to the real values or to assume the risks which the calculations themselves imply.
 An alternative to the costs methodology is to establish conditions, or trigger 
clauses, which will activate changes in the controlled prices according to demand. 
Another alternative is to allow larger margins of return in the initial periods and to 
reduce these margins towards the future, when the enterprise who took the initial 
risk is already beginning to face cost reductions because of technological or scale 
developments, and competition begins to appear.
 Whatever the case may be, and as a general rule, it is important that regula-
tory conditions will adjust as much as possible to the expectations of investors and 
to the policies defined by the country, in order to avoid destroying incentives for 
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investment. Those mechanisms which allow some type of adaptation to demand are 
well received by investors.
 More generally the implementation of a price above the WACC as a payment 
for the consolidation of all of the risks is an additional methodology.
 In general, traditional models do not correctly take into consideration the 
high risks of new investments in networks with high initial investment and long 
periods of repayment which have an uncertain demand. Because of it they are not 
compatible with an incentive policy for the development of infrastructure. The risk 
of failure, which is assumed to be asymmetrical by the investors, makes the cost of 
opportunity greater than the WACC calculated as usual without considering the ad-
ditional risk. The opportunity rate of capital for economic regulation should take into 
consideration the risks which lie above the WACC. The WACC takes into considera-
tion the averag risks of the industry with relation to the country where it takes place. 
This methodology does not include risks which locally affect certain investments and 
which are above the industry mean. 
 Procedures relative to investments are hard to manage because allowing re-
turn values greater than the WACC may generate image problems and medium-term 
commitments. One alternative is to grant so-called “regulatory vacations” under 
strict conditions and during a certain period in which neither supply nor economic 
obligations are established.
 These vacations, if adopted, must be accompanied by the regulator in order to 
avoid cross-subsidies which may arise from charging high prices, beyond that which 
corresponds to the assumed risks, with the goal of subsidizing competing services. 
This aspect must be analyzed with respect to the rights of the competition. 
 This is the principal difference in contrast to the regulation of traditional tech-
nologies for which everything was more predictable, both because of the national 
background and because of international experiences.
 Another aspect to be considered is allowing the differentiation of prices ac-
cording to the commitment that the access requester assumes this option has resulted 
in anticompetitive conducts.
 The risk sharing through coinvestment encourages investment and is very 
effective in the sense that those who participate compete downstream, for example 
by deploying fiber, mounting towers and even radio bases (RAN sharing), etc.
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3.7 Convergence and its effect. Regulatory authorities
 With convergence the limits of the market are pushed back and they may 
come to include services from other nonregulated industries, which also implies 
more extensive considerations in the evaluation of the Dominant Operator.
 It is observed that the market power may come from services which are alien 
to the usual services of ICT regulation, and on the other hand its evolution is hardly 
predictable. In particular, audiovisual services may be sold over broadband infra-
structures. For this reason, the identification of problems that justified the ex-ante 
regulation must be more careful.
 The application of correct and timely incentives is important for promoting 
the development of investments which support the increasing broadband demand. 
Under these conditions, before prospectively regulating ex ante for all possible cases, 
it seems convenient to regulate ex post mainly over the basis of the rights of the com-
petition without completely giving up ex ante regulation.
 Because the provided services are the main vector of broadband demand, the 
concern of regulators falls both in connectivity itself and also in the services that tra-
ditionally fall outside of the regulatory reach of ICT. 
 Broadband networks behave like platforms. The analysis of competition 
should consider this particularity of the business models at work. 
 Control and power to abuse the domain through the control of infrastructures 
and derivative services is no longer established, as has traditionally been the case, 
but is instead tied to the control of, for example, “must-have” content. This content 
is such that users will have a hard time ignoring it, such as the case of football or 
baseball. Video and other services and applications should be considered while eval-
uating markets and dominance.
 Following this trend, several countries have looked for convergence regula-
tors which begin to understand matters which didn’t previously concern them, al-
though this is not necessarily the only or best path to take. The situation generally 
varies according to the country, and due to differences in origin there is no unique 
recipe for dealing with matters which include efficiencies and potentially anticom-
petitive conducts.
 Some regulatory authorities are receiving the order of also managing radio 
transmissions and content. Example: Thailand, Australia. Other countries have ex-
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panded these mandates by constituting multi-sectorial agencies which regulate more 
services than ICTs. Examples: Denmark, where all commerce related activity were 
concentrated, Hong Kong, where telecommunications and broadcasting were fused 
together. There are several countries with convergent ICT and broadcasting regula-
tors such as: Austria, Bahamas, Canada, Chile, etc.
3.8 Relevant retail markets
 The reach of the services within a market is determined through an assess-
ment of the sustainability of both offer and demand as well as the geographical reach. 
In this process the Test of the Hypothetical Monopolist is used. This will not be cov-
ered in detail as there exist abundant and well known information regarding this.
 Broadband access is only one mean which allows access to a variety of servic-
es, and allows producers to distribute their services. This is the heart of convergence, 
it allows to visualize broadband networks as interaction platforms between provid-
ers and consumers.
 The analysis of the markets is affected by the services required by the users. 
The technological differences matter only in relation to services which may be ob-
tained through them, their velocity, their mobility and their symmetry parameters.
 The role of marginal clients. The definition of the market should take into 
consideration marginal (non-captive) clients, which are those groups which are large 
enough to be candidates to pass the hypothetical monopolist test. It is through these 
marginal clients that the competitive limitations which a provider imposes upon an-
other are determined.
 Because providers are still able to discriminate between clients without iden-
tifying them through commercial plans, it may be necessary to expand to various sub 
markets for a single service as well as to offer different plans. 
 Chain of substitutability. Marginal clients may generate a substitutability 
chain. FTTH marginal clients may move towards VDSL due to an increase in price 
above the competition’s level, and the same thing may happen with the VDSL and 
ADSL markets. Therefore all three form part of the same market. Marginal clients 
generate this chain which originates from the fact that the definition of the market 
is mainly based on the conditioning factors of prices which a service imposes upon 
others through the chain. 
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 Geographical reach. Geographical reach permits refining the regulatory pro-
cess by excluding zones in which competition exists.
 Asymmetric substitutability. Sometimes it is observed that services from a 
market A are substitutes of another market B, but not the other way around. In this 
case the services from market A, impose restrictions on the behavior of service pro-
viders in market B but not conversely, for example in ADSL – FTTH. In this case two 
markets are defined.
 Packages. The situation arises for making the decision of including or ex-
cluding packages in markets. Services included in packages influence the decision 
of clients with regards to the determination of the substitutability and therefore they 
influence the reach of the market. Considering the connectivity and service packages 
may be an efficient way of dealing with coordination in cases of service driven broad-
band demand. However, it may be concealing aspects relative to the difficulties of 
the client for changing provider and therefore may affect the correct definition of the 
market. Among the difficulties to be considered we find:
a. Difficulties of the clients in the comparison between packages.
b. Difficulties when abandoning the package and migrating some of the services to 
another provider. At the very least a transaction cost exists.
 One way of facing the situation when defining markets is to observe whether 
the clients are prepared for discarding the package in the event of an increase in price 
in order to hire individual services. 
 The European Union indicates that if evidence exists that a significant amount 
of (marginal) clients is willing to migrate to other individual service providers, these 
services must integrate the same market.
 In this case, as always, it is necessary to begin with the competition price in 
order to carry out the test. The price of competition is fixed considering the costs 
saved by the package and scope economies. Parting from the current price is incor-
rect because it may be a high price in relation to costs, and therefore when carrying 
out the hypothetical monopolist test we arrive to the conclusion that individual ser-
vices are part of the same relevant market, which would not be true if we start from 
the competition price.
 Another concern regarding price compression originates from the great dis-
counts in regulated service package (broadband) as well as unregulated (television) 
services, even when the individual price of broadband passes the compression test. 
-15-
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Assuring enough margin between wholesale and retail prices of the individual ser-
vice does not guarantee that there will not be compression through packages when 
the discount is large. An inflated price for the individual service may steer clients 
towards the package, generating problems for new businesses to compete in the in-
dividual services market.
3.9 Dominant operators or operators with significative power in the mar-
ket (SMP)
 The most important factor in shifting the vision of the existing methodology for 
determining Significant Market Power (SMP) is that of packages due to convergence.
 OTT services may modify relevant markets and therefore may increase or 
diminish the SMP of broadband providers. Especially indispensable (“must have”) 
services for users, when provided by selected networks, give rise to a vertical rela-
tionship which should be taken into consideration when evaluating SMP. In this case 
there is no control over infrastructure but there is control over the service which is 
provided over it. It is a relationship in which the provider of the services charges 
additionally for giving exclusivity. The overprice which the user pays, if that were 
the case, goes mostly to the provider of the content since the broadband provider is 
obtaining an exclusivity advantage over its own services.
 Regulatory decisions relevant to obligations about access for avoiding dom-
inance should take into consideration the access to content as well as the access to 
the infrastructure. 
 In the evaluation of SMP it is necessary to consider the possibility which other 
providers have of successfully replicating the packages, be it the same or a different 
competitive package.
 If replicating package proves difficult, competition problems will arise. 
Replicability should be analyzed on a case by case basis and conclusions are not 
generalizable.
 Replicability depends upon: the architecture of the network belonging to the 
operator with SMP, the imposed wholesale obligations and their implementation, the 
infrastructure of alternative operators and the access to content.
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3.10 Relevant wholesale markets
 The greatest threat for the collapse of the retail market resides in the whole-
sale level. If adequate regulation measures are taken in this level, effective competi-
tion at the retail level may be achieved. These markets establish limitations within 
retail markets without direct regulatory intervention, through the open access at the 
wholesale level.
 The theory behind this concept is the investment ladder. It is clear that a broad 
offer of wholesale services facilitates retail competition, but nevertheless there isn’t 
enough evidence that this will facilitate investment in competitive infrastructure. In-
termodal infrastructure is widely generalized in Latin America.
 Considering that wholesale demand is derived from retail demand, retail 
substitutability should be considered when defining wholesale markets.
 
 Packages in wholesale markets. When retail markets are developed where 
packages matters, the package is to be considered in the definition of the correspond-
ing wholesale markets. One alternative, like the one taken by the United Arab Emir-
ates, is to make wholesale and retail markets correspond, both in individual services 
and in service packages, and to include their provision of services to third parties on 
the basis of the services and packages offered at the wholesale level.
3.11 Bilateral markets
 Internet access providers, or ISPs, are those which provide access for end-us-
ers of the network. Through the ISP, the user may download and use content, appli-
cations and services. Until recently this market was unilateral and the ISP mainly 
turned towards the user in the sale of services and also towards the upstream Inter-
net access provider for the purchase of global access. 
 With the recent expansion of content distribution networks (CDN), which be-
gan to request hosting directly from the final ISPs, in other words those which have 
access to the users, these ISPs begin to operate within a bilateral market.
 We observe the introduction of the concept of unilateral markets (“single-sid-
ed markets”), which are those that we find usually, in order to distinguish them from 
multilateral markets (“multi-sited markets”), which have a different treatment and 
which are presented in this case with the emergence of CDNs. Multilateral markets 
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involved at least two groups of agents which interact among them through interme-
diaries, called “platforms”, in this case ISPs, and in such a way that the benefit of one 
of the groups from joining the platform depends on the size of the rest of the groups 
which integrate it. The economic surplus may be created or destroyed during the 
interaction between the different groups. In this case platforms, when they must take 
decisions regarding prices or investments, must take into consideration the interac-
tion between the demands of the different groups. The economic analysis carried out 
by regulators which ignore the correct wrist sticks of a multilateral market may lead 
to errors, such as determining that a price is predatory when in reality it is not. Oper-
ators may develop anticompetitive policies in a multilateral market, but it turns out 
to be necessary to be more careful to characterize them.
 These characteristics of ISPs should be taken into consideration in the regula-
tion of aspects related to them. 
 In general we observe that the conditions of competition mechanisms of 
self-control of CDN prices play a part in this market. These mechanisms affect end-us-
ers in spite of the fact that the ISP has exclusive access to them. Because of this, the 
stance of regulators is usually to observe and wait.
3.12 Impact of convergence in the radio-electric spectrum
 The following are the basic principles within which spectrum management 
policy is usually established.
Technical efficiency in the usage. It includes the improvement of management, 
relocalization, and spectrum recovery tools, establishing minimum conditions for 
the use of the bands, efficiency indicators, etc.
Economic efficiency. To define, in a justified manner, adequate limits in order to 
allow development in the first place, and at the same time avoid concentration. 
Rebalance command-and-control models, common use, and exclusive market-ori-
ented rights.
Social efficiency. Within the framework of the previous principles it is necessary to 
consider that a balance must exist between economic efficiency and social efficien-
cy. The main consequence is that part of the spectrum may and should be destined 
toward social ends and government use, according to defined policies but main-
taining the cost of opportunity (value) of these attributions visible.
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 The main concepts to be evaluated and considered are presented in the mo-
ment when we define the methodology and objectives of the spectrum management 
in response to the presence of convergence.
 One of the most urgent matters for spectrum regulators is to find a way in 
which to sustain the increase in the use of the spectrum driven by wireless broad-
band. The usual spectrum management procedures are being questioned regarding 
securing a more efficient use of this scarce resource. One aspect that must be high-
lighted is the granting of permits or licenses which make the rules of spectrum usage 
more flexible. The administrative methods are being replaced increasingly by mar-
ket focuses which attempt to apply economic criteria in order to achieve the highest 
value which the use of the spectrum can provide in each case. When the flexibiliza-
tion refers to licenses which are currently in effect, it is necessary to ensure that the 
rights acquired by other operators are not being affected. Regulators should monitor 
whether an action of this kind will provoke unforeseen competitive imbalances or 
extraordinary profits.
 An important matter within the analysis of spectrum management is related 
to its use for broadcasting or for services which converge over broadband. There is 
a trend for the adequate use of the spectrum for broadband access for broadcasting, 
subtracting importance to the first. In a convergence environment, in which content 
begins to flow over broadband (often times wireless), it is important to analyze the 
greater value for society regarding the use of the spectrum in these low frequen-
cies. The main aspect is that payments issued for its use are generally smaller for 
broadcasting than the value of said spectrum for society, or the value which society 
assigns to it. From the perspective of the market, an inconsistency is generated which 
is nevertheless explained within reasonable limits by the intangible value that this 
usage has for the citizens. With the advancement of the usage of other media and the 
advancement of convergence, the need arises to better analyze this traditional policy. 
When multiple platforms are able to transport content, the separation of the spec-
trum for broadcasting and other uses results fundamentally artificial. The objective 
should be to determine what the most efficient use for this scarce resource is. 
 These concepts posed the need to consider a unified framework for assigning 
and managing the spectrum independently of its destination. This ensures a better 
understanding of the efficient use of the spectrum and makes it possible to react with 
promptness. The central concept is that the attribution should be fundamentally ori-
ented by the management of the spectrum itself and not by the content, and that its 
value should be oriented towards the market. However, the scope of this strategy of 
profound change finds itself counteracted and limited by the introduction of the im-
portant intangible value of the use of the spectrum for ends relevant to public interest 
and cultural and social objectives. At any rate, it would be important to quantify and 
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publish the monetary value which the spectrum conceded for this purpose has, with 
the purpose of informing the society about the value which it provides. Policy should 
rise from the analysis of these values to a higher level of spectrum regulation.
 As far as licensing goes, it is important to separate the license for the emis-
sion of content from the license for spectrum use. This provokes a more efficient 
usage of the spectrum while maintaining the obligations of radio diffusers. This sep-
aration also allows a more precise understanding of the value of the spectrum which 
is being used for Content diffusion. In any case we should seek to not leave unused 
spectrum during large periods of time as a result of excessive regulation, since this 
will mean that we are not taking advantage of its value for broadcasting or telecom-
munication services.
 More generally, it becomes important to analyze the following matters and 
their application in presence of the change produced by convergence:
To define a sustainable policy in the presence of convergence in order to ensure 
transparency and predictability.
To ensure timely assignments to improve the exploitation and continuity of devel-
oped services.
To seek the efficient use of resources in spite of changing requirements.
To make the management of interfaces more efficient through procedures which 
relieve the regulators.
To ensure the availability of radio-electric spectrum for public use.
To fulfill international obligations.
 Another aspect which requires attention in this time of mobile broadband ex-
pansion is that of spectrum caps which are established in order to avoid the hoarding 
of the service but which may restrict its development.
 With the purpose of efficiently managing the spectrum and ensuring that  the 
needs for the development may be satisfied in the future, many countries are creating 
national spectrum policies, either as part of a joint ICT/broadband plan or separately.
 Policy authorities and regulators of the sector have begun to develop policies 
based on the market (for example, auctions, flexible use, migration within broad-
band, the shared use of spectrum and the spectrum secondary market), in order to 
complement or even substitute slow bureaucratic processes with administrative 
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management procedures. Furthermore, regulators have developed a variety of fo-
cuses to ensure that the services are extensively deployed, the spectrum is utilized in 
the most efficient way, and competition is encouraged.
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